We provide a comprehensive study of the valuation consequences to meeting/beating analysts' forecasts (MBE) versus missing expectations conditioned on the forecast revision path prior to the earnings announcement. We find that investors reward firms that walk down forecasts to achieve a positive earnings surprise and penalize firms that walk up forecasts to achieve a negative earnings surprise. The reward and penalty are not justified by subsequent cash flow performance and the post-event return reversal suggests that investors were partially misled by strategic motives belying the forecast revisions.
Introduction
Prior studies have documented that the equity market rewards firms that meet or beat analysts' earnings expectations (hereafter MBE) and penalize those that do not.
1 The immediate price reaction to an MBE event at the earnings announcement date is generally positive whereas firms that miss forecasts generally experience a negative price reaction.
The stock returns in the fiscal period (quarterly or annual) of the earnings are also higher for MBE firms than miss firms, even when they have the same initial analysts' forecast at the start of the period and the same actual reported earnings at the end of the period. We refer to the higher period returns for MBE firms over miss firms after controlling for the size of the forecast revision if any and the surprise as the MBE reward.
Two forecast paths lead to an MBE event. The first, which has received attention in the literature, is the walk down revision path OP where the initial optimistic forecasts are guided down to pessimistic levels prior to the earnings announcement date. The second path PP begins and ends with pessimistic earnings forecasts during the quarter. Similarly, two different forecast revision paths lead to a miss event. The initial pessimistic forecast is guided up to become optimistic before the earnings announcement date in the walk up PO path whereas the initial and final forecasts remain optimistic in the OO path. Figure 1 summarizes the trajectory of these four analysts' forecast revision paths.
When the underlying economic fundamentals fail to deliver earnings that meet or beat analysts' expectations, managers can avoid negative earnings surprises by managing reported earnings upward (Cheng and Warfield, 2005) or guiding analysts' expectations downwards (Soffer, Thiagarajan, and Walther, 2000) . This phenomenon is often referred to as the "earnings numbers game" and is viewed unfavorably by regulators (Levitt, 1998) and the media (Cohen, 1991) . Bartov and Cohen (2008) report that forecast guidance is more widespread than earnings management to achieve MBE, and so the former is the focus in this paper that considers analysts' revision paths.
Our first objective is to study the incentives of the firm and managers to play the numbers game by managers guiding analysts' forecasts either downwards to a beatable level or upwards for a deliberate miss outcome. While the walk down phenomenon has been studied in the literature, the incentives to a walk up for a miss event have not. For incentives, we consider new equity issues or repurchases by the firm, and insider net selling by the managers in the months after the earnings' announcement.
Our second objective is to investigate the extent to which investors are cognizant of the strategic incentives that belie the earnings numbers game. We compare the period return to the future operating performance between firms with a walk down (OP) of analysts' forecasts to an MBE event versus firms that did not walk down and so miss expectations (OO) to study whether the MBE reward is justified. Similarly, we also compare the period return and future operating performance between firms with a walk up (PO) of analysts' forecasts to a deliberate miss event versus those that did not and so achieve an MBE (PP) to study whether the miss penalty is justified.
If investors only partially discount for strategic motives associated with a walk down, they will reward a walk down to an MBE firm (OP) when compared with OO. Similarly, investors will penalize firms that walk up to a miss (PO) compared to PP. If the subsequent true underlying performance for either the strategically motivated walk down or walk up firms, however, is not much different from their corresponding benchmark firms, then the reward and penalty are not justified.
We also examine whether investors' response to the earnings surprise is contingent on the revision path prior to the earnings announcement. If investors are somewhat skeptical of the positive earnings surprise from a walk down OP firm relative to a PP firm, their stock price reaction will be more muted. Similarly, investors' reaction to a negative earnings surprise from a walk up PO firm would also be more muted relative to the OO firm. However, the positive reaction for OP and negative reaction for PO are overreactions relative to full discounting by fully attentive investors. Therefore, walk down OP firms and walk up PO firms will experience a post-event return reversal. Since an MBE event is good news and a miss bad news, we need to adjust the post-event returns
for the effects of the well-known post-earnings announcement drift anomaly (PEAD). . Prior research and anecdotal evidence also suggest a substantial increase in the use of analysts' estimates as a benchmark for firm performance, and increased prevalence of the expectations game in the 1990s (e.g. Richardson et al., 2004) . 4 The widespread 2 See Bernard and Thomas (1989) . 3 We choose to study quarterly periods over annual periods to increase the number of observations and so maximize the power of our tests. 4 Several financial information sources began providing earnings benchmarks based on analysts' forecasts on the Internet in the mid-1990s. One of the best known, First Call, introduced its service to the web in 1994.
publicity and regulatory crack-down on the earnings numbers game in recent years likely have raised investor awareness of the MBE phenomenon. (Jain and Rezaee, 2006; Bartov and Cohen, 2008; Koh et al., 2008) . Therefore, as a third objective, we examine whether the path-dependant return reactions are also time period specific. Given the likely regime change at the dates noted above, we partition the sample period into three sub-periods, 1984-1994, 1995-2000, and 2001-2006. For firms with initial optimistic forecasts, we find that the market rewards firms that walk down the forecasts to an MBE event (OP) compared to the miss firms (OO), consistent with Richardson et al. (2004) . However, the walk down reward disappears after 1995, consistent with increased investor awareness of the earnings numbers game from the popular press and academics. In contrast, we find that firms that walk up forecasts to a miss event (PO) are penalized relative to firms that beat forecasts from the start (PP) in all three sub-periods.
For the short-window market reaction to earnings surprises following different forecast revision paths, we find that the market's reaction is significantly smaller for surprises achieved through switching of expectations with walk down OP or walk up PO revision paths, as compared to their counterparts with consistent optimism (OO) or consistent pessimism (PP) respectively throughout the quarter. This evidence suggests that investors do discount somewhat for such earnings games. Whether they discount appropriately and sufficiently or not can only be determined by evaluating post-event operating performance and post-event return reversals.
For the walk down OP firms relative to the OO firms, the subsequent quarter ROA increases only in the two earlier sub-periods. Moreover, the increase is not from an increase in cash flows from operations. If accruals are more easily managed than cash flows from operations, the results suggest that OP firms are in effect no better performers than OO firms. The MBE reward of OP firms over OO firms in the early period is therefore not justified, implying that investors are misled by the walk down. The disappearance of the MBE reward in later periods, however, suggests that investors learn to discount the walk down.
Similarly, the poorer next quarter earnings performance of walk up PO firms relative to PP firms occurs only in the early periods, and is not supported by worse cash flows. In other periods, neither the earnings nor cash flow performances are all that different.
However, investors continue to punish walk up PO firms relative to PP firms in later sub-periods, suggesting that investors may not be sufficiently attentive to the strategic incentives of PO firms to obtain a miss event.
If investors do not fully discount the information in the positive earnings surprises achieved through a walk down path, OP firms will be temporarily overvalued and a stock return reversal is likely to follow. However, given the existence of the post-earnings announcement drift, which we consider to be driven by a different source, the reversal will dampen the magnitude of the upward-return drift related to PEAD and may not be strong enough to dominate it. A similar argument about temporary undervaluation can be applied to the PO path, in which case we expect that the future return reversal for a walk up will offset part of the downward PEAD drift. Consistent with this conjecture, we find that the PEAD effect is dampened among the switching OP and PO firms than among the consistent OO and PP firms, controlling for the magnitude of earnings surprises. We find that over time the magnitude of PEAD for OP and PO firms converges to that of OO and PP firms, which is again consistent with investors' increased awareness of the numbers game.
Turning to incentives, consistent with Richardson et al. (2004) , we find that OP firms engage in more stock selling activities (insider net sales and equity issuance) than OO firms following earnings announcements, but not in the latest sub-period. The disappearance of these incentives in 2001-2006 is consistent with the earlier returns results that investors no longer reward the numbers game and that the managers are aware of the change in investor reaction.
The new finding is that walk up (PO) firms engage in more stock purchase activities (insider net purchases and equity repurchases) than PP firms following earnings announcements, which supports the interpretation that the walk up PO path is a strategy managers employ to depress the firm's short-term stock price to facilitate buying at a cheap price.
We contribute to the literature in several ways. We provide a comprehensive study of the valuation consequences for the four expectations revision patterns. The four-way comparison of the future stock return and operating performance tests allow us to investigate more fully whether the market reward to MBE or penalty to a miss is justified.
We also contribute to the earnings surprise literature by documenting that the market's reaction to earnings surprises is dependent on the expectations revision path. We extend Richardson et al.'s (2004) analysis on firm and managerial capital market incentives to the walk up sample and demonstrate that managers also have incentives to deliberately miss benchmarks. Overall, our findings have implications for regulators, capital market participants, and researchers who wish to better understand the causes and consequences of earnings expectations guidance.
Related Literature and Research Questions

Market Reward to Meeting or Beating Earnings Expectations (MBE)
The capital markets penalize severely those firms whose reported earnings fail to meet market expectations (Skinner and Sloan, 2002) . Not surprisingly, therefore, anecdotal and academic evidence suggests that firms seek to avoid reporting negative earnings surprises (Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser, 1999; Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna 2003; Brown and Caylor, 2005) either by upward earnings management (Cheng and Warfield, 2005) and/or downward forecast guidance (Matsumoto, 2002; Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn, 2002) to attain MBE, with the latter mechanism being more prevalent (Bartov and Cohen, 2008) . In addition to the event stock price reactions, Bartov et al. (2002) Even if the reaction to earnings surprise is path-dependant, the differential reaction does not reveal whether investors are able to see through the expectations guidance game fully. To investigate this question, we need to examine whether subsequent price reversals, if any, are path-dependant. The test here is complicated by the presence of PEAD, which may be driven by other causes. To tease out the effects of PEAD, we use the returns conditioned on the size of SUE from the relatively non-strategic groups OO and PP groups as estimates of PEAD for the strategic revision path groups OP and PO. Therefore, we test the following:
Is the post-earnings-announcement drift weaker for the OP and PO revision paths than
for the PP and OO revision paths?
Guidance to Drive Down the Firm's Short-term Price
The extant literature on expectations guidance focuses almost exclusively on managers' incentives to achieve MBE targets. Richardson et al. (2004) report increased new issues and net insider selling associated with a walk down OP path as compared with the OO path. On the flip side, managers may also have incentives to miss forecasts so as to benefit from the temporarily depressed stock prices, as when they intend to purchase the firm's stock either on their firm's behalf (via stock repurchases or a management buyout) or on their own personal account (via insider purchases or options grants).
Similar incentives have been documented using the earnings management mechanism (Gong et al. (2008) for stock repurchases, McAnally et al. (2008) for stock option grants).
To the best of our knowledge, no study to date has examined the incentives for a walk up revision path as an expectations guidance mechanism to depress price. We test this hypothesis:
H5. For a firm with an initial pessimistic forecast, the likelihood of observing a walk up forecast revision path prior to the earnings announcement increases in managers'
incentives to purchase its firm's stock after the earnings announcement, either via insider net buying on personal account or via a repurchase of the firm's stock.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
Data
Individual analysts' forecasts of quarterly earnings are from Thompson Financial We study a firm's trading incentives by considering two types of securities transactions: equity issuance and equity repurchases. The equity issuance and repurchase variables are derived from the statement of cash flows (COMPUSTAT data item 84 and item 93, respectively) and are scaled by the market capitalization at the beginning of the quarter. 6 To be consistent with the construction of INSIDERSALE, we combine the scaled equity issuances and repurchases to create the variable FIRMSALE, with a positive value denoting net equity issuance and a negative value denoting net equity repurchases. In stark contrast to the PP path, the relative frequency of OO decreases from more than 40% in the mid-1980s to about 20% in our latest sub-period. This may explain why studies in the 1980s tend to document that analysts are on average optimistic, while studies using more recent data find that analysts are on average pessimistic. The walk up PO path accounts for less than 10% of the sample in most years and shows a slight decline from 9% in the earliest sub-period to about 6% in the two later sub-periods. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for our sample partitioned into the four forecast revision paths. OP firms are on average larger and have higher market-to-book than OO firms. They also outperform OO firms both in the current and next quarters, when measured using both return on assets (ROA) and cash flow from operations (CFO). 7 The quarterly returns (CAR_ERROR) and event day returns (CAR_SURP) are also better for OP than those for OO, whereas the post-quarter return reversals (CAR_PEAD) are larger for OO than OP. When comparing PP to PO, we find very similar results in that PP firms outperform PO firms. These univariate results are consistent with Bartov et al.'s (2002) proposition that MBE is a leading indicator of future performance, even for the walk down OP firms.
Time-series Patterns of the Four Expectations Revision Paths
Descriptive Statistics
Comparing the two paths OP and PP that lead to MBE, PP firms outperform OP firms in all dimensions, both current and future ROA and CFO, and stock returns, which suggests that the positive earnings surprises of PP firms convey more reliable good news than those of OP firms. For the two revision paths leading to a negative surprise or miss event, we find that OO firms perform significantly worse than PO firms, suggesting that OO firms are more reliably bad news firms than PO firms.
In the next section, we perform multivariate analyses to control for the magnitude of the earnings surprise, size of the analyst revisions and other confounding factors in the above comparisons that will allow for more definitive inferences. We test for whether the analyst revision path preceding the earnings announcement has implications for firms' future performance, and whether investors understand these implications.
Investor Reactions to the Four Analysts' Revision Paths
Reward to walk down and penalty to walk up (Q1a and Q1b)
We first examine whether the prior finding of a reward to the MBE event itself extends to the more recent periods. As in past studies, the valuation reward is measured as the incremental market-adjusted quarterly return for MBE firms (OP and PP) relative to miss firms (OO and PO) after controlling for the magnitude of the forecast error and earnings surprise. Specifically, we run the following regression:
CAR_ERROR j,q is firm j's market-adjusted stock return cumulated from three days after the release date of the earliest forecast for quarter q (FEARLIEST j,q ) to one day after quarter q's earnings announcement. The empirical results for these regressions are in Table 3 . Panel A exhibits that, even after controlling for the forecast error (ERROR) and earnings surprise, MBE firms still observe a higher market-adjusted stock return for the entire quarter in both the earlier Bartov's (2002) sample and more recent sample (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) Recent evidence suggests that the reward to MBE diminishes after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Koh et al., 2008) . Our analysis implies that this result is driven by the disappearance of the reward in the walk down group.
Rationality in the Market's Reward to Walk Down and Penalty to Walk Up
We demonstrate that investors penalize walk up PO throughout our sample period, and a reward to walk down OP in the early sample period. The next question is whether these valuation effects are justified by the underlying performance of the firm. In this sub-section, we conduct three tests to examine this issue.
MBE and Future Operating Performance (Q2a and Q2b)
If the reward to walk down (OP) and penalty to walk up (PO) are justified, we 
Δ_ROA is the change in return on assets (ROA) one quarter ahead.
Δ_CFO is the change in cash flow from operations (CFO) one quarter ahead.
MV is the logarithm of the market value of equity.
MTB is the market-to-book ratio.
The results are reported in Table 5 . We correct for the time-series dependence of the performance measures by clustering at the firm level to obtain White standard errors to compute t-statistics (Petersen, 2009). In Panel A, ROA increase is larger for OP than OO during 1984 to 2000, but the CFO change between these firms is not significantly different in any of the sub-periods. If managers have more discretion in reporting ROA than CFO using accruals management, these findings suggest that, in the earlier years of the sample, investors reward good news surprises even when the firms do not deliver higher future CFO but they catch on to the walk down game over time.
We use one-quarter-ahead performance measures for the above tests because learning is more likely when the underlying economic fundamentals (i.e., future performance) are revealed within a short period of the gaming event. The results are similar when we use one-year-ahead change in ROA and CFO.
Panel B of Table 5 reports the next-quarter performance of PP versus PO. The PP valuation premium over PO does not seem to be justified. PP does not deliver consistently higher future operating performance in the three sub-periods. The only significant difference in performance measure is the increase in ROA over the next quarter for the first sub-period. The change in CFO in the next quarter is no different between the two groups of firms in all three sub-periods, and the change in CFO is actually smaller for PP than PO firms using annual data in the 1995-2000 sub-period.
The evidence therefore suggests that valuation penalty for "walk up to miss" firms is not justified.
Short-window Price Reaction to Earnings Surprises (Q3a and Q3b)
If investors understand the underlying gaming nature of walk down or walk up revision paths, they would consider the forecast revision path leading up to the earnings announcement when responding to the earnings surprise. We test whether they do so using the following regressions in equation (4) 
where CAR_SURP j,q is the market-adjusted return for firm j in quarter q cumulated from two days after the latest forecast date for the quarter to one day after the earnings release date. 13 OP indicator variable is set to one for OP firms, and zero for PP firms in regression (4). Similarly, PO indicator variable is set to one for PO firms, and zero for OO firms. If investors discount the information in earnings surprises resulting from a walk down PO or a walk up OP, we predict that δ 3 <0 and γ 3 >0.
The results are reported in Table 6 for each year. For brevity, we only report the 12 Splitting SURP into SURP + and SURP -in the regression does not qualitatively change the main results. We use this simplified version for brevity. 13 The results are similar if we use a three-day window around the earnings announcement date. coefficients and associated t-statistics on OP and PO indicator variables. Consistent with our prediction for Q3a, δ 3 in Column I is significantly negative in all 23 years, indicating that investors do pay attention to the revision path. They are skeptical about the positive earnings surprises achieved through a walk down and hence apply some discounting of the good news. The coefficient is much more negative in the latest 3 years, consistent with heavier discounting in recent years.
Column II also confirms that negative earnings surprises attained through a walk up are perceived by the capital markets to be less credible (Q3b). The estimated coefficient on PO indicator variable, γ 3 , is significantly positive in all 23 years, consistent with investors discounting bad news that is achieved through a walk up.
In summary, investors do seem to realize the strategic nature of the positive earnings news achieved through a walk down and the negative earnings news achieved through a walk up and adjust their price reaction accordingly.
Stock Return Reversal Analyses (Q4)
The above analysis on the short-window price reaction only reveals that investors realize, at least to some degree, the strategic nature associated with both a walk down and a walk up. However, it does not answer the question of whether investors adjust fully in their price response. To address this issue, we check for future stock return reversals for the two strategic revision paths, OP and PO.
For each calendar quarter, we form five equal-sized portfolios based on the magnitude of SURP across all the sample firms. Then, within each quintile we separate firms into two groups, one containing the strategic firms OP and PO and the other containing the non-strategic (or at least less strategic) firms OO and PP. For each group, we calculate the average return in the subsequent quarter (CAR_PEAD) for each quintile for all three sub-periods. The hedge portfolios for the SUE strategy are constructed by buying the highest SURP quintile and shorting the lowest SUE quintile for the strategic OP and PO sub-group and for the non-strategic PP and OO sub-group. By ranking all firms on SURP first, we use the same cut-offs for the SUE quintile, and therefore control for the magnitude of earnings surprises between the strategic and non-strategic subgroups.
The average CAR_PEAD and the hedge returns are reported in Table 7 for the two sub-groups for each of the sub-periods.
The hedge returns in the PP and OO sub-group average 4.87%, 6.20%, and 5.0% respectively for the three sub-periods, which are comparable to the magnitudes reported in the literature (Bernard and Thomas, 1989; Livnat and Mendenhall, 2006) . In contrast, the hedge return in the OP and PO sub-group which comprises the walk down and walk up sample is not significant in 1984-1995 sub-period, increases to 2.22% in the second sub-period and to 4.04% during 2001 to 2006.
We interpret the above results as follows. The post-quarter returns are largely driven by the effect of PEAD in the non-strategic sample. For the strategic sample, however, the post-quarter returns will depend on how the PEAD effect offsets the return reversals from insufficient discounting of preceding quarter earnings surprises from strategic walk down or walk up activities. Note that the return reversals operate in the opposite direction from the PEAD effect. In the earliest period, investors did not discount sufficiently for these strategic motives so the return reversals tend to be large and of sufficient magnitude to completely offset the PEAD effect, resulting in no hedge returns. If one uses the hedge return from PEAD in the non-strategic sample of -4.87% as an estimate of the PEAD effect for this sub-period, then the return reversal from the correction of the overreaction to the earnings surprise in the strategic sample is actually about 4.61%, which is statistically significant.
In contrast, in the latest sub-period when there is much less overreaction to the earnings surprise for the strategic sample (as reported in the previous sub-section), the small return reversals are insufficient to dampen the PEAD effect. Therefore the hedge returns from the SUE strategy show a net significant 4.04% for the strategic sample, which is almost as large as the PEAD effect for the less strategic sample of 5.03%.
Summarizing the results in this section, we find that before 1994, compared to firms with consistent optimistic forecasts OO, initial optimistic forecast firms that walked down their forecasts to a positive earnings surprise enjoy a stock return premium that is not justified by later operating performance. This premium is diminished after the mid-1990s.
In contrast, firms with consistent pessimistic forecasts PP continue to enjoy a premium over those with initial pessimistic forecasts that walk up their forecasts to miss expectations, and this premium is not justified by later operating performance. So while investors have learned to discount MBE from a strategic walk down of forecasts, they remain overly pessimistic about walk up firms. A walk up motive seems less intuitive than a walk down motive and has not been of as much focus of attention from the regulators and the media. We consider explicitly the incentives to both a walk down and a walk up by managers and firm next.
Equity Trading Incentives
In this section we examine how net selling behavior of insiders and new issues or repurchases by firms may affect incentives to walk down or walk up forecasts.
The Walk Down Revision Path and Equity Transaction Incentives (H5)
Richardson et al. (2004) 
INSIDERSALE is the net percentage of shares traded within one month after the earnings announcement; it is positive when insiders are net sellers and negative when insiders are net purchasers.
FIRMSALENOW is the issuance or repurchase of common and preferred equity during the quarter; a positive amount denotes equity issuance (COMPUSTAT data item 8 deflated by beginning-of-quarter market value) and a negative amount denotes stock repurchases (COMPUSTAT data item 93 deflated by beginning-of-quarter market value).
FIRMSALENEXT is the FIRMSALENOW value in the subsequent quarter.
RD is the research and development expenditure scaled by average total assets.
LITIG is an indicator variable equal to one for high litigation risk industries as defined in
Matsumoto (2002), and zero otherwise.
CHEARN is an indicator variable equal to one for a positive change in earnings from the same quarter in the prior year, and zero otherwise.
The results of regression (6) are in Panel A of Table 8 . Consistent with Richardson et al. (2004), we find that OP revision path is more frequent in firms with subsequent net insider sales and equity issuance in the early sub-period. Interestingly, net insider sales is statistically insignificant and equity issuance even reverses its sign in the post-scandal period (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) , which suggests that these incentives disappear once investors stop rewarding a walk down to MBE.
Walk Up and Equity Transaction Incentives (H5)
We observe in our sample period a relatively small and somewhat stable proportion (9% in earliest period and 6% in later sub-periods) of walk up PO firms. Are these PO paths merely a random outcome or are they also driven by capital market-related incentives? To test our hypothesis H5, that PO is a strategic move by managers to walk up forecasts to elicit a temporarily dampening of the stock price and thereby facilitate equity buying, we re-estimate regression (6) by contrasting PO and PP firms with the indicator variable set to one for PO. We expect that β 1 <0 and β 3 <0.
Panel B of Table 8 reports our findings. The coefficient estimate on INSIDERSALE, β 1 , is significantly negative for each of the three sub-periods, consistent with the prediction that insiders buy more following a walk up of forecasts to a deliberate miss.
FIRMSALENEXT is significantly negative, indicating firm repurchase of stock, in the earliest period 1984-1994. In sum, the walk down and walk up paths are related to managerial incentives to sell equity for the former and to buy equity for the latter either on personal account or on behalf of the firm. The insignificant coefficients on FIRMSALENEXT in periods after 1995, in contrast to the persistent significance of INSIDERSALE suggest that managers have stronger incentives to trade on their own account than for the firms' benefit when playing the numbers game.
We also consider analysts' incentives to cooperate in this earnings numbers game.
We find that analysts of walk down firms and those of walk up firms are rewarded with greater accuracy in the subsequent quarter or year. We do not tabulate these results as they are similar to Ke and Yu (2006) though they did not interpret their results for the walk up case and their period ends in 2000. As Ke and Yu suggests, the results imply that cooperative analysts are rewarded with greater access to management, and so are able to be more accurate (though more biased). Past literature also note that investment banks that employ analysts with favorable forecasts are more likely to be selected to underwrite new equity issuances and tender offer repurchases.
Conclusions
In this paper we find evidence of a coherent relation between managers' incentives and investors' response to the MBE event via a walk down of analysts' forecasts and a miss event via a walk up of analysts' forecasts, and how the relation evolved over time.
The past literature suggests that managers walk down analyst forecasts to report positive earnings surprises so as to boost firms' stock prices and facilitate stock selling.
Consistent with this view, we find that investors do reward a walk down with a valuation premium over the quarter that the phenomenon occurs, and that managers take advantage of the temporary valuation premium to sell equity on personal account or on behalf of the firm. However, the valuation premium is erased once investors become aware of the strategic motive underlying a walk down of analysts' forecasts to achieve a positive earnings surprise in recent years. Once the valuation premium is erased, managers have less incentive to sell stock.
On the flip-side, we find that managers have incentives to depress stock prices to facilitate their buying shares on personal account or firm repurchases with a walk up of forecasts to deliberately miss analysts' expectations. Our evidence shows that walk up firms are indeed punished by investors relative to those that experience consistent pessimistic forecasts in the quarter and so meet or beat expectations. In response, managers are more likely to buy shares on personal account or the firm to repurchase stocks in walk up firms. Investors do not appear to have learned to discount for these strategic motives even in recent years.
When they exist, the valuation premium for a walk down to MBE and the penalty of a walk up to a miss are not warranted by future operating performance. In general, the future cash flows are no different for walk down firms and walk up firms when compared to consistent optimistic forecast firms and consistent pessimistic forecast firms respectively. In more careful tests, we find that the valuation premium or penalty is the result of insufficient discounting for potential strategic motives behind walk down or walk up gaming. Instead, investors overreact to earnings surprises following walk down or walk up, and their subsequent return reversals offset the well-known PEAD effect.
In sum, we find evidence that there are rewards to the earnings numbers game for firms and managers at investors' expense. In more recent years, the rewards to a walk down have largely disappeared when investors have become aware of the phenomenon.
However, the rewards to a walk up, a phenomenon that has been largely ignored in the literature and by regulators and the press, continue to exist. Investors therefore need to be more skeptical of intentional bad news surprises from a walk up revision of analysts'
forecasts. (OP, OO, PP, and PO) , the first letter refers to the optimistic(O)/pessimistic(P) status of the first forecast of the quarter, and the second letter refers to the optimistic(O)/pessimistic(P) status of the last forecast of the quarter. A forecast is labeled as O (P) if it is higher than (lower than or equal to) the actual earnings of the quarter. OP corresponds to walk down and PO corresponds to walk up. The dependent variable CAR_ERROR is defined as the cumulative market-adjusted returns over the period from three trading days after the first forecast to one trading day after the current-quarter earnings announcement.
ERROR is defined as actual EPS from I/B/E/S minus the earliest EPS forecast made for the quarter, deflated by the beginning-of-quarter stock price. SURP is actual EPS from I/B/E/S minus the latest EPS forecast made for the quarter, deflated by the beginning-of-quarter stock price. DMBE equals one if SURP>=0, and zero if SURP<0. SURP + equals SURP when SURP>=0, and zero otherwise. SURP -is set to SURP when SURP<0, and zero otherwise. DSMALLSURP equals one if the absolute value of SURP is smaller than 0.02%, and zero otherwise.
Bold numbers indicate significance at the 5% level (two-tailed t-test). For Column I and II, we report β 4 and its t-statistics for the regression:
CAR_ERROR is cumulative market-adjusted returns over the period from three trading days after the first forecast to one trading day after the current quarter earnings announcement. CAR_SURP is cumulative market-adjusted returns for the period from the last forecast for the quarter to one day after the current-quarter earnings announcement.
ERROR is defined as actual EPS from I/B/E/S minus the earliest EPS forecast made for the quarter, deflated by the beginning-of-quarter stock price. SURP is actual EPS from IBES minus the latest EPS forecast made for the quarter, deflated by the beginning-of-quarter stock price. DMBE equals one if SURP>=0, and zero if SURP<0. SURP + equals SURP when SURP>=0, and zero otherwise. SURP -is set to SURP when SURP<0, and zero otherwise. DSMALLSURP equals one if the absolute value of SURP is smaller than 0.02%, and zero otherwise.
Bold numbers indicate significance at the 5% level (two-tailed t-test). ROA is return on assets. CFO is cash flow from operations deflated by total assets. The quarterly change of ROA or CFO is measured relative to the same quarter in the previous year, namely, Δ_ROA q =ROA q+1 -ROA q-3 ; Δ_CFO q =CFO q+1 -CFO q-3 . SIZE is the logarithm of the market value of equity. MTB is the market-to-book ratio. All ROAand CFO-related variables are restricted to be within 100% of total assets. ERROR is defined as actual EPS from I/B/E/S minus the earliest EPS forecast made for the quarter, deflated by the beginning-of-quarter stock price. SURP is actual EPS from I/B/E/S minus the latest EPS forecast made for the quarter, deflated by the beginning-of-quarter stock price. DMBE equals one if SURP>=0, and zero if SURP<0. SURP + equals SURP when SURP>=0, and zero otherwise. SURP -is set to SURP when SURP<0, and zero otherwise. DSMALLSURP equals one if the absolute value of SURP is smaller than 0.002%, and zero otherwise. All regressions include quarter dummies and the errors are clustered by firm. Bold numbers indicate significance at the 5% level (two-tailed t-test). 
For Column II, we report 3 γ and its t-statistics for the regression: 
CAR_ERROR is cumulative market-adjusted returns over the period from three trading days after the first forecast to one trading day after the current-quarter earnings announcement. CAR_SURP is cumulative market-adjusted returns for the period from the last forecast for the quarter to one day after the current-quarter earnings announcement.
SURP is actual EPS from I/B/E/S minus the latest EPS forecast made for the quarter, deflated by the beginning-of-quarter stock price. DSMALLSURP equals one if the absolute value of SURP is smaller than 0.02%, and zero otherwise.
Bold numbers indicate significance at the 5% level (two-tailed t-test). For each calendar quarter, we form five equal-sized portfolios based on the magnitude of SURP. Then we construct two hedge portfolios by buying the highest SURP quintile and shorting the lowest SURP quintile within the OP-PO group and PP-OO group, respectively. The average hedging returns over the subsequent quarter (CAR_PEAD) and its associated t-statistics are reported for each group and sub-period.
Bold numbers indicate significance at the 5% level (two-tailed t-test). 
